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I. INTRODUCTION
In their paper, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee provide a broad
overview of the current state of our theoretical and empirical knowledge
regarding the efficiency effects of interchange fees.
1 They also draw broad
conclusions regarding the implications of this state of knowledge for pub-
lic policymaking. Evans and Schmalensee assert that:
There is no apparent basis in today’s economics—at a theo-
retical or empirical level—for concluding that it is generally
possible to improve social welfare by a noticeable reduction
in privately set interchange fees. Thus, if antitrust or other
regulators had to show that such intervention would
improve welfare, they could not do so.
2
I agree with several aspects of Evans and Schmalensee’s characterization
of our current state of knowledge. But I disagree with their bottom line for
policymaking. In part, this disagreement arises because I think they are
addressing the wrong question. To my mind, the central question is not
whether one can conclude it is generally possible to improve social welfare
by reducing interchange rates. Instead, I think the central issue is whether
the circumstances of a specific market under consideration are such that
governmental intervention can be expected to improve economic welfare.
3
Even with respect to this narrower question, I think that Evans and
Schmalensee are too pessimistic about our ability to understand the 
economics of network fee setting. The best way I know to explain our 
differences in this regard is to offer my own overview of the state of our
theoretical and empirical knowledge, and to offer my own view of the
implications for policymaking.
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 The remainder of this comment is organized as follows. The next two
sections provide a foundation for the later analysis. Section II lays out an
economic approach to policy analysis. Section III argues that the focus on
interchange fees can be misleading in some circumstances. In these set-
tings, a better approach would be to focus on network fees more broadly.
Section IV provides a very brief survey of the theoretical literature regard-
ing network fees more generally, and Section V addresses the current state
of empirical knowledge. Section VI then argues that the informational
demands for policymaking may not be as great as they might first appear.
A brief conclusion closes.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
There is a consensus among economists that certain public policies, such as
the definition and enforcement of property rights, are fundamental to the
existence of well-functioning markets. There is less of a consensus regarding
the extent to which public policy should go further and intervene to limit 
private-sector price setting or impose other forms of economic regulation.
Interestingly, there is wide agreement on the appropriate analytical framework
in which to address questions of the appropriate degree of intervention. Evans
and Schmalensee summarize this consensus view in terms of two questions:
• “Is the performance of the market or markets being considered 
substantially suboptimal?”
• “Is there a practical regulatory policy that is reasonably certain to
improve market performance substantially?”
4
One can debate some of the fine points of these two questions (for
example, the second question might better be stated in terms of expected ben-
efits and costs rather than terms such as “substantially” and “reasonably cer-
tain”), but they do capture the central points. 
An economic analysis of regulation’s effects weighs the potential costs and
benefits of regulation. The latter depend, in part, on how well markets 
function in the absence of regulation. There is broad agreement among
economists that market outcomes generally possess desirable characteristics,
but that unregulated markets can lead to inefficient or unfair outcomes in
certain circumstances. To the extent that a market outcome is inefficient or
unfair, there may be scope for regulation to improve the outcome.
5
Poor market performance alone, however, does not imply that regulation
will improve matters. One must consider whether intervention can address
the problem identified. One must also consider the costs of regulation,
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 both administrative costs and the costs of unintended consequences. The
latter can be very significant and typically arise because policymakers have
limited information on which to act. Consequently, the state of knowledge
has far-reaching implications for policy analysis. 
III. INTERCHANGE, SWITCH FEES, OR ALL OF THE ABOVE? 
Interchange fees are the focus of much of the policy debate regarding
payment networks. In this section, however, I will argue that this focus
sometimes runs a danger of confusing the issues.
An interchange fee is a monetary amount that flows between the finan-
cial institution serving a merchant at which a payment card has been used
and the financial institution that issued that card. A distinguishing feature
is that this fee is not retained by the payment card network. Rather, it is
passed through from one participating financial institution to the other.
With only one exception of which I am aware, debit and credit card sys-
tems have interchange fees that flow from the merchant acquirer to the
card issuer.
6
To see why an excessive focus on interchange fees can be misleading in
some circumstances, it is helpful to introduce a few pieces of notation. Let
t denote the interchange fee, measured as the flow of money from the
acquirer to the issuer. Let wA denote the (switch) fee that the payment net-
work charges an acquirer when the network processes a transaction involv-
ing that institution. And let wI denote the (switch) fee that the payment
network charges an issuer when the network processes a transaction involv-
ing that institution. In terms of this notation, the net price paid by an
acquirer for a transaction over this network is wA + t, and the net price paid
by an issuer for a transaction is wI -t .
7 Observe that these are the prices of
interest for purposes of understanding acquirers’ and issuers’ economic
incentives and the resulting efficiency effects. Fundamental economic logic
indicates that the level of transactions, the prices charged by issuers and
acquirers, and network profits all can be expressed as functions of the net
prices to acquirers and issuers, ceteris paribus.
In general institutional settings, knowing the value of t alone tells one
nothing about the net prices acquirers and issuers face for using a network.
The following table shows why. As illustrated by the first two rows, iden-
tical interchange fees can be associated with very different net prices. The
reason is that the network’s switch fees may attenuate or strengthen the
flows associated with interchange. The first and third rows further illustrate
this general point by showing how different values of the interchange fee
can give rise to identical net acquirer and issuer fees.
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wA tw I to acquirers to issuers
0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1.5% -0.5%
1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 2.0% -1.0%
0.0% 1.5% 1.0% 1.5% -0.5%
The following irrelevance result provides still another way of seeing that
an overemphasis on interchange can be misleading in some circumstances.
For any value of t, the network can set wA and wI to obtain any pair of net
prices desired, and the value of t has no effect on the resulting network 
revenue per transaction.
8 It follows that if the network is free to choose its
issuer and acquirer fees, then the level of the interchange fee is irrelevant.
Of course, in certain circumstances, an interchange fee is a well-defined
concept. Suppose, for example, there is no central network authority col-
lecting fees (for example, the Australian EFTPOS system), so that both wA
and wI equal 0.
9 Then the value of t uniquely determines the prices faced
by acquirers and issuers. Similarly, if a centralized network prices its 
services to break even and sets wA and wI at “low” levels, one can focus on
t and largely ignore wA and wI without doing too much violence to the 
welfare and efficiency analysis.
10 But it should be kept in mind that when
one is considering a network for which wA and wI are subject to choice and
are set at non-negligible levels, they can no longer safely be ignored.
The point made in this section is more than one of terminology. First, it
shows that by strategically setting its transactions fees, a network might
evade regulations that focused solely on interchange fees. Second, efficien-
cy issues concerning issuer and acquirer fees, both in absolute terms and
relative to one another, can arise even in the absence of interchange fees
(for example, with a network, such as American Express, that does not have
formal interchange fees even when it has issuer partners). Third, because
some payment networks do not have formal interchange fees, regulation
that focuses on interchange fees may apply to some networks but not all.
The effects of asymmetric regulation merit particular attention when
that regulation concerns the price structure (for example, the ratio of the
acquirer and issuer prices) rather than absolute levels. Consider a “stan-
dard” market in which a regulatory body imposes a binding ceiling on the
prices of only one of several competing suppliers. When the regulated sup-
plier is forced to lower its prices, competing suppliers may be forced to match
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tion may come close to having symmetric effects on all of the suppliers. In
contrast, when regulation imposes a price structure, competing 
suppliers may not be forced to match. Instead, they might well continue to
offer price structures that more successfully attract usage of their networks.
Hence, the market outcome resulting from asymmetric regulation of price
structures may be itself asymmetric, and there may be greater potential for dis-
tortions in competition and a resulting loss of efficiency.
11 Of course, it does
not follow that all asymmetric regulation is inefficient or otherwise undesir-
able. There may be sound reasons for treating different networks differently
(for instance, significant differences in the degree of market power), but it is
useful to keep in mind the possibility of distorting network competition.
IV.   A SHORT REVIEW OF A LONG LIST OF THEORETICAL PAPERS
With this background, now consider what economic theory has to say
about the setting of interchange fees, paying particular attention to the
comparison of privately and socially optimal rates. In recent years, there
has been an explosion of work on these issues. In this section, I will offer a
highly selective overview that is just comprehensive enough to identify the
points central to the policy debate. I will then draw out initial implications
of these findings.
A. Key findings
The following five findings from the theoretical literature lie at the heart
of the policy debate.
12
1.  Changes in the net prices to acquirers and issuers will be
passed through to consumers in ways that generally affect trans-
actions volumes.
At first glance, an interchange fee is solely a payment that goes between
a card-issuing institution and a merchant-acquiring one. However, holding
the network switch fees constant, the level of interchange affects acquirers’
costs and thus can be expected to affect merchant service fees. Merchant
service fees, in turn, may affect merchants’ card-acceptance decisions and
the prices merchants charge their customers. Moreover, again holding
other network fees constant, the interchange fee affects an issuer’s incen-
tives for card issuance, including incentives with regard to both pricing and
promotional strategies aimed at cardholders. Economic theory thus sug-
gests that the level of an interchange fee (or the levels of network fees more
generally) can have significant effects on card use and resulting levels of
economic welfare and efficiency.
13
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will not predictably affect the pricing and promotional incentives of
issuers.
14 Such claims, however, run counter to standard economic theory (as
well as raise questions of why networks have interchange fees flowing to
issuers).
15 A change in incremental costs will affect a supplier’s profit-maxi-
mizing output level, regardless of whether the firm is a perfect competitor,
monopolist, or something in between.
16
There is a theoretical result about the effects of interchange fees on other
prices that has attracted considerable attention because it leads to a second
interchange irrelevance result: If merchants can and do costlessly surcharge
and issuers can and do costlessly adjust their transactions prices (including
rebates) to cardholders, then the level of the interchange fee is irrelevant.
17
Intuitively, each side of the market simply passes the effects of any interchange
fee through to the cardholder/customer; an increase in the interchange fee
raises the rebate for card use, which encourages card use, but it also increases
the surcharge for card use, which exactly offsets the increased rebate. 
2.  The network prices that maximize total surplus depend on
demand conditions.
Consumption of payment services generally involves two sides of the
transaction—a consumer and a merchant—each of whom takes actions,
receives benefits, and bears costs. Moreover, the decisions made by one side
of the transaction generally affect the economic well-being of the other.
The fact that each side of a transaction needs to take actions in order for
the transaction to take place raises the possibility each side will make pri-
vately optimal, but socially inefficient, decisions because each will fail to
take into account effects on the economic welfare of the other party to the
transaction. The prices that acquirers and issuers charge for card holding
and transactions play a role in determining the incentives for consumers to
hold and use cards and for merchants to accept them. Network pricing
matters in all of this because it affects the resulting prices charged by
acquirers and issuers.
Both commercially and socially optimal network pricing entail making
tradeoffs in terms of the effects that various price structures will have on
consumer and merchant holding, use, and acceptance decisions. An impor-
tant lesson of this analysis is that, in general, making the socially optimal
tradeoff depends on the benefits realized by each side of the transaction
(also known as the demand conditions), as well as the costs of transactions.
Consequently, purely cost-based rules (for instance, “set the price charged
to the cost-causer at marginal cost”) are unlikely to attain full efficiency.
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 The dependence of efficient prices on demand conditions is not as unusu-
al as some people appear to believe. It also arises, for example, when mar-
ginal cost is not constant. Specifically, the rule that price should equal mar-
ginal cost does not determine uniquely the price if marginal cost changes
with the volume of production. In this case, demand conditions are relevant
to efficient pricing because demand will influence the scale of production.
Similarly, the theory of multiproduct Ramsey pricing—which characterizes
efficient pricing subject to the constraint that suppliers earn non-negative
profits—finds that efficient pricing depends on demand conditions when
average costs are greater than marginal costs, so that marginal-cost pricing
would lead to supplier losses.
3.  Even with constant unit costs, the prices that maximize
total surplus generally are below cost.
In a non-two-sided market, a rule that sets price equal to marginal cost
does define the unique efficient price when there are constant unit costs
(and certain other conditions are met as well).
18 In a two-sided market,
however, the prices that maximize total surplus generally are below cost
even when there are constant unit costs.
19 Intuitively, each side’s decision to
engage in a transaction generates benefits for the other side, but a self-
interested decision maker will ignore these effects when he or she decides
whether the benefits of a transaction are greater than the price he or she
faces.
20 Thus, each side should face prices below marginal cost in order to
help internalize these effects.
Because merchants and cardholders interact with a payment network
through acquirers and issuers, a second pricing consideration arises. When
acquirers and/or issuers are imperfectly competitive and individual suppli-
ers have some degree of market power, they will tend to set their prices
above their private marginal costs. Fully efficient network prices would
account for these markups. Suppose, for example, that acquirers are per-
fectly competitive but that issuers exercise market power and set prices
above their marginal costs.
21Then, in theory, it can be optimal to lower the
price charged to issuers and raise the price charged to acquirers to offset the
differential markups.
22 In addition to considering acquirer and issuer
markups, one also could consider the degree to which merchants mark
their prices above their costs.
It is worth observing that this situation, while unusual, is far from unique.
First, consider economic consequences that cut across individuals. The
socially optimal price of vaccinations, for example, is less than marginal cost
because getting a vaccination confers benefits on other, unvaccinated people,
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effects of imperfect competition. Similar effects arise whenever one is consid-
ering the price of input provided to a producer with significant market power
or one is considering a public policy of subsidizing such producers.
4.  The network prices that maximize network profits gener-
ally diverge from total-surplus-maximizing network prices, but
may do so in a variety of ways.
Now consider the choice of network fees by a profit-maximizing network.
It is useful to decompose potential distortions into two components: the net-
work’s margin and the balance of its charges between acquirers and issuers.
23
A first observation is that a profit-maximizing monopoly network sets its 
margin higher than is efficient. The reason for this distortion is essentially the
same as the standard monopoly output restriction. Second, taking its margin
as given, a profit-maximizing monopoly network sets the issuer and acquirer
charges to maximize transactions volume. This behavior can be a second
source of distortion because the network owner does not take into account the
fact that different transactions can have different net social benefits associated
with them. In theory, the resulting distortions in the relative prices charged to
issuers and acquirers can run in either direction.
Equilibrium under network competition can also entail pricing distor-
tions. Specifically, suppliers may respond to one side of the market (for
example, lower the net price to that side of the network to attract that side’s
patronage) to an inefficient degree. This is similar to a situation that can
arise under Ramsey pricing: Competing suppliers set their prices in
response to firm-specific elasticities, but socially optimal prices may be
functions of market elasticities.
24
Although there are theoretical arguments running in both directions,
there is a powerful intuition suggesting that relative network prices will be
distorted toward high acquirer fees because of the nature of merchant
incentives. There are two elements. First, so-called “merchant resistance” to
high merchant service fees will be too low due to externalities across mer-
chants.
25 Specifically, by accepting particular payment cards, a merchant
may increase its sales but do so at the expense of rival merchants. Thus, the
collective benefits of a merchant’s accepting payment cards may be much
lower than the merchant’s individual benefits. Consequently, there are 
situations in which a set of merchants will find it individually rational to
accept a payment card even though the merchants would collectively be
better off if none did.
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 The lack of sufficient merchant resistance is reinforced to the extent that
merchants tend to accept the cards of multiple payment networks and
afford their customers the choice of which payment mechanism to use
without taking significant efforts to steer consumer choice. In this setting,
a network will have incentives to set fees that are relatively attractive to
issuers in order to induce them to take actions that promote consumers’
use of that network’s cards. 
5.  The network prices that maximize a weighted average of
acquirer and issuer profits generally diverge from the total-
surplus-maximizing prices.
MasterCard and Visa manifestly do not set their interchange and net-
work fees to maximize network profits. Several papers model the card asso-
ciations as maximizing a weighted combination of issuer and acquirer prof-
its. These models focus on interchange fees and implicitly assume that wA
and wI are fixed at negligible levels.
These analyses find that the privately set interchange rates depend, inter
alia, on: (a) the relative weights assigned to issuers and acquirer and (b) the
relative degrees to which issuers and acquirers pass through changes in
interchange to cardholders and merchants, respectively. For example, if
issuers retain some of the interchange fee so that their profits increase with
the fee (holding fixed the level of transactions) but acquirers are sufficient-
ly competitive that they earn zero economic profits regardless of the inter-
change fee, then a network that puts any weight on issuer profits will set
the interchange rate to maximize issuer profits. Analysis of the general case
demonstrates that privately set interchange fees can, in theory, be above or
below the social optimum, depending on the specific weights and degrees
of pass-through.
26
The distortions due to the nature of network competition and merchant
competition discussed under Finding 4 above can also arise in the setting
under consideration here. There is also a consumer externality that can
come into play in addition to the merchant externality identified above. In
the model used by Rochet and Tirole (2002), competition between mer-
chants results in their equilibrium profits being independent of the inter-
change fee level. Nonetheless, high interchange rates can give rise to wel-
fare losses by inducing excessive payment card use. These adverse welfare
effects arise because of a pecuniary externality among consumers.
Anticipating that some consumers will use expensive payment instruments,
merchants will raise their prices, harming all consumers, both card users
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decision does not take these effects into account. Hence, high interchange
fees can result in a transfer of surplus from consumers to issuers through
an inefficient mechanism: excessive card use.
B. How far does theory get us?
Findings 3, 4, and 5 indicate that the market outcome is almost certain-
ly inefficient. Finding 1 indicates that these inefficiencies will flow through
to the prices faced by merchants and consumers. But Finding 2 and the
analyses that underlie it indicate that determining the total-surplus-maxi-
mizing prices can be a complex and difficult task.
27 Moreover, Finding 3
on the efficiency of pricing below cost indicates that policymakers may
have to operate in a second-best world in which they will likely not be able
to induce the first-best outcome because network suppliers might other-
wise cease operation.
Where theory leaves us is with concern about market performance, but
also with concern about the possibility of unintended, adverse conse-
quences from otherwise well-intentioned regulation. Theory alone is not
going to answer the question of whether public policy intervention in 
general, or a specific form of intervention in particular, will improve 
welfare. We need to look at the facts.
This conclusion should not be surprising. As Evans and Schmalensee
point out, there are many theoretical models of imperfect competition in
which suppliers’ equilibrium choices may deviate from the welfare-optimal
ones and may do so in ambiguous ways. Examples include entry in the pres-
ence of economies of scale, bundling, price discrimination, and research and
development.
28 Indeed, I sometimes joke that the only general theorem in
the economics of industrial organization is that there is no other general
theorem. Stated another way, people sometimes object to oligopoly theory
on the grounds that anything can happen. This claim is an overstatement,
but it contains a grain of truth. But it also does not mean that the situation
is hopeless.
Among the most important questions for public policy are whether all
theories are equally plausible and whether empirical analysis can be used to
resolve the ambiguities of various models. Consider for the moment an
example unrelated to payment networks. Specifically, consider the public
policy treatment of a price-fixing cartel comprising a number of chemical
producers. One can write down theoretical models in which the cartel out-
come is more efficient than the noncollusive outcome.
29 But we do not
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 allow this possibility to paralyze public policy toward price fixing. Indeed,
the efficiency-enhancing effects are considered so unlikely that price fixing
of this sort is per se illegal in the United States.
Turning to an example closer to home, Evans and Schmalensee are correct
that one can construct a logically coherent theory under which a reduction
in the rate at which consumers earn rewards for using their credit cards will
encourage greater card use (this is known in other contexts as a backward-
bending supply curve).
30 However, I would argue that until someone 
provides empirical evidence of such an effect (and I am not aware of any), it
is reasonable to assume that consumers respond to decreased rewards by
reducing their use of credit cards.
V.T HE BROAD STATE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
Facts clearly are needed. Ideally, various theories of network fee setting
would give rise to empirically testable hypotheses, and those hypotheses
would be tested against data. And, ideally, we would have a series of com-
prehensive, rigorous studies of cost and demand conditions for alternative
payment mechanisms that would be based on generally accepted principles
and methodologies.
At present, reality falls short of this ideal. Although various theories have
been put forth about how interchange rates (or the prices to the two sides
of various payment systems, more generally) are privately set, these theo-
ries have not been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. Similarly, although
there are many different studies of the costs of various payment instru-
ments, there is a lack of consistency in terms of the definitions and
methodologies used. Turning to demand studies, data collection efforts are
made difficult by the personalized nature of prices that people face. Some
consumers enjoy interest-free periods on their credit card accounts, while
others (for example, those carrying a balance) do not. Rewards programs
can have pricing elements that are sensitive to purchase volumes in a non-
linear way. Similarly, debit card accounts may allow a certain number of
free transactions per month before a transaction fee takes effect.
Even though the state of empirical knowledge is far from ideal, it would
be a mistake to conclude that we do not know anything about payment
instruments. In fact, there is a lot of information available about costs,
demands, and fee setting. It would be desirable to get more information,
but a major task before public authorities is to pull together what exists
today and to make use of it through triangulation, approximation, and a
healthy dose of caution.
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Models that address the consequences of banning no-surcharge rules provide
one example. Several of these models have focused on the limiting case of 
frictionless surcharging and the resulting irrelevance of interchange fees.
Understanding this limiting case is useful in understanding the economic
forces at work more generally. But there is little reason to believe that, in 
practice, interchange fees will become meaningless if merchant surcharging is
allowed. This is so in part because, although there is debate regarding the exact
extent of surcharging, the actual degree of surcharging has been limited in
those countries where it is allowed.
31 Here, one does not need a deep investi-
gation of the facts to rule out an extreme theoretical possibility.
Consider a second example. As discussed in the previous section, economic
theory indicates that interchange fee setting by a card association will depend
on the weights the association’s objective function assigns to issuer and acquir-
er profits, as well as the relative degrees of issuer and acquirer pass-through.
Industry wisdom is that most of the weight is put on issuer profits, at least in
the United States, and that acquirers generally pass through a higher percent-
age of fee changes to their customers than do issuers. Both of these factors (in
addition to others discussed above) suggest that a privately set interchange rate
will be above the efficient level, not below.
VI. DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIZING ON INFORMATION
Almost any public policy decision must be made under conditions of
uncertainty and limited information. Policymakers almost never have all of
the information that might be relevant to their decisions because collect-
ing complete information generally is too costly and takes too long. In
response to the lack of complete information, policymakers implicitly or
explicitly must form beliefs about the probabilities of various possible out-
comes, which then are combined to develop projections of average likely
net benefits.
More information would be useful, but one should not overstate the
needs. One of the great virtues of the market economy is the way in which
it economizes on information costs. In some circumstances, regulation can
make use of market forces to economize on information as well.
The choice between private automobiles and public transportation illus-
trates how the market economy economizes on information and how pub-
lic policy can take advantage of this virtue. Suppose that policymakers wish
to promote efficient use of public transportation by pricing it appropriate-
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 ly. It might seem that policymakers would need to know a lot about con-
sumer demands for various modes of transportation. But as long as con-
sumers face relative prices that reflect underlying social costs, the choice
among transportation modes can efficiently be decentralized. A rational
consumer will choose the transportation mode that maximizes the surplus
of the consumer’s benefits over the costs that he or she faces. When the con-
sumer faces prices that reflect social costs, he or she will thus choose the
transportation mode that maximizes the surplus of benefits over social costs.
It may be possible to apply a similar approach to the choice among pay-
ment mechanisms. There is, however, a potentially important difference
between choice among payment mechanisms and the automobile/public
transportation decision. Payment networks are examples of platforms or
two-sided markets. That is, they operate as intermediaries. As discussed
above, that means that—in theory, at least—one needs to consider demand
on both sides of the network at once.
There is an argument made by some analysts, however, that implies that
“mature” payment networks might reasonably be treated as one-sided plat-
forms at the margin. In this context, “mature” refers to a situation in which
the payment network is so well established that most merchants feel the
need to accept it and would be highly insensitive to small changes in 
merchant service fees. In this case, interchange fees have the greatest
impacts through their effects on consumer behavior. For example, Rochet
has posited that “[when] the choice of payment instrument is ultimately a
decision of the buyer, that impacts the net costs of the seller.”
32 Thus, to a
first-order approximation, one might be able to treat mature payments sys-
tems as being one-sided markets, at least for certain changes. When a con-
sumer faces prices that reflect the underlying social costs of the alternative
payment mechanisms, the consumer can be expected to choose the pay-
ment mechanism that maximizes the surplus of benefits over costs.
33 There
is no need for policymakers to have detailed knowledge of the consumer’s
benefits and resulting demand functions.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The title of the conference asks, “What role for public authorities?” The
paper by Evans and Schmalensee and the discussion above identify a very
helpful answer: Continue collecting information, including data on the
costs of alternative payment mechanisms, the nature of merchant 
acceptance decisions, and the market structures for issuing and acquiring.
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1 Evans and Schmalensee (2005).
2 Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 79).
3 Indeed, as discussed below, Evans and Schmalensee themselves state the issue in
similar terms.
4 Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 97).
5 A common response by economists is to call for a division of labor in policies
under which economy-wide tax schemes are used to promote fairness (that is to say,
redistribute income in accordance with the objectives of the relevant policymakers)
and market-specific regulatory intervention is limited to correcting efficiency prob-
lems (that is to say, market failures) or ameliorating their effects. In practice,
however, many market-specific policies are implemented in part with the objective
of redistributing income.
6 The one exception is the Australian PIN debit (EFTPOS) network, in which
the interchange payment flows from the card-issuing institution to the merchant-
acquiring one.
7 Interchange fees often are levied as percentages of the transaction value. 
8 That is, given interchange level t and desired net prices α and β, the network
can always solve for wA+t =α and wI-t =β earn revenues of α+β per transaction.
9 Alternatively, wA and wI can be interpreted as the acquirers’ and issuers’ respec-
tive costs of interconnecting and communicating with one another. For many
purposes, these costs can be taken as exogenously given.
10 This is, in effect, what Rochet and Tirole (2002), among others, do.
11 A similar situation arises when nominal prices are regulated, but quality levels
are not. In this case, a regulated firm may be forced to pursue a low-price, low-
quality strategy while unregulated rivals are free to compete using a high-price,
high-quality strategy if that better attracts profitable patronage.
12 Summaries of significant papers in the earlier literature are provided in Katz
(2001) and Rochet (2003).
13 For similar reasons, economic theory suggests that the levels of various network fees
can raise fairness issues. For the sake of brevity, I will not address these issues further.
Author’s note: The author would like to thank Joseph Farrell for helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
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14 For example, Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 103) focus on pricing and write
that: “It would appear to be generally the case that the interchange fee is a highly
imprecise instrument for affecting the volume of transactions on cards and thus for
correcting any perceived market distortion. That is because there is only a loose
connection between interchange fees and transactions prices to cardholders.”
15 For a brief discussion of empirical findings in this area, see Weiner and Wright (2005).
16 One exception is certain theories of oligopoly that predict rigid prices. Under
such a theory, a supplier might not change its price in response to a cost change out
of concern that doing so would destabilize the current equilibrium in some unde-
sirable way (for example, trigger a price war).
17 A general version of this result is proved by Gans and King (2003). Two addi-
tional points are worth observing. First, surcharges can themselves internalize
effects across merchants and consumers and, thus, play a role ascribed to inter-
change fees. (See Katz (2001) and references therein.) Second, monetary payments
directly between issuers and merchants can have effects similar to those of inter-
change, again highlighting the value of taking a broad view of fees when conducting
efficiency analyses.
18 With constant unit costs, marginal cost is equal to average cost and both have
a unique value. Thus, setting price equal to marginal cost determines a value of
price that does not depend on the level of production and marginal-cost pricing will
cover average costs. The additional necessary conditions include an absence of
externalities and a lack of distortions in the rest of the economy.
19 A more technical argument is needed to establish the precise result. See Evans
and Schmalensee (2005) and the references therein. See also Hermalin and Katz
(2004), which establishes this result in a different institutional context entailing
direct sales to the network’s end users.
20 Rochet (2003) refers to this effect as the “fundamental externality” of
payment networks.
21 Rochet and Tirole (2002) explore this case in the context of interchange fee setting.
22 Expanding on Katz (2001), Vickers (2005, p. 239) argues that these considera-
tions provide an “unappealing” basis for setting interchange rates, and that policies
aimed at promoting issuer (or acquirer or merchant) competition would be preferable.
23 Hermalin and Katz (2004) provide an analysis along these lines.
24 See, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2003).
25 Rochet and Tirole (2002) provide an elegant formal model of this phenomenon.
26 See Wright (2004) and references therein.
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27 Finding 2 indicates that the efficiency justification for cost-based pricing regu-
lation cannot be that it is sufficient to achieve a fully optimal outcome. Instead, it
must be that either markets can be treated as if they are one-sided at the margin (see
the discussion below) or cost-based pricing is taken as an approximation that serves
as the basis for making a directional improvement. As long as the resulting cost-
based prices are tested against what is known about demand conditions, this type
of cost-based pricing can be a rational policy response to information limitations.
28 Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 96).
29 For example, if there are economies of scale, it could (in theory) be more effi-
cient to have a cartel allocate production to just one supplier and have the firms
share the resulting monopoly profits. Alternatively, if there are other distortions in
the economy, the cartel’s output restriction might (in theory) offset those distor-
tions in a beneficial way.
30 Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 112).
31 Of course, even if there is a low level of surcharging, one should not conclude
that the possibility of surcharging is irrelevant. First, there is heterogeneity across
merchant sectors, so that surcharging may be important in some sectors even if it
is used by a small percentage of merchants overall. Second, the possibility of
surcharging may affect equilibrium network behavior (there are some indications
that this may be happening in Australia with respect to American Express and
Diners Club). An analogy may be useful. One should not measure the success of
traffic fines by the amount of money collected when someone runs a red light. A
fine that completely deterred the running of red lights might be optimal even
though it collected no revenue. Similarly, the effects of possible surcharges should
not be measured solely by the degree of actual surcharging. 
32 Rochet (2003, p. 98).
33 If merchants try to influence consumers through various financial incentives, those
incentives should be factored into the calculation of the prices that consumers face.MICHAEL L. KATZ 137
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